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induce the Indians to peacefully accept United States authority in the Northwest Territory. The violence that
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"Under the Auspices of Peace": 
The Northwest Indian War and its Impact on 
the Early American Republic 
By 
Melanie L. Fernandes  
~      ~ 
 
 In April, 1789, George Washington was inaugurated as the 
first president of the United States of America.  Filled with pride 
for his new country and hope for its future, he spoke in his 
inaugural address about the prospects of the United States. 
Washington was clear that above all, the new government of the 
United States should do right by itself to preserve the nation and 
protect its citizens: 
 
In these honorable qualifications, I 
behold the surest pledges, that as on 
one side, no local prejudices, or 
attachments; no seperate [sic] views, 
nor party animosities, will misdirect 
the comprehensive and equal eye 
which ought to watch over this great 
assemblage of communities and 
interests: so, on another, that the 
foundations of our National policy 
will be laid in the pure and 
immutable principles of private 
morality; and the pre-eminence of a 
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free Government, be exemplified by 
all the attributes which can win the 
affections of its Citizens, and 
command the respect of the world.231  
 
Washington wanted for no particular group's interests to dictate the 
government's policies, and he wanted to ensure that the 
government would always have the nation and its citizens' best 
interests in mind. For Washington, this was one means of working 
towards his main goal for the nation: that the United States as a 
new nation would "command the respect of the world."  
 In order to achieve this, Washington had numerous 
ambitious, but necessary, goals for the nation.  He wanted to 
reduce the national debt, establish a strong currency, and reopen 
trade and renew amiable relations with the British. In short, his 
goals all had to do with economic and national security, which he 
understood to be crucial to the protection and success of the nation. 
Washington and his contemporaries knew that proving the 
legitimacy of the United States to major European powers was 
extremely important during the early years of the republic, as this 
was when it was most vulnerable. Unfortunately for these men, the 
process of establishing the foundation of the United States was far 
more complicated than they would have hoped. Along with all the 
pressures of establishing order and an effective government, 
                                                          
231 Dorothy Twohig, The Papers of George Washington, Presidential Series 
(Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1987-2015), 2:152. 
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managing the national debt from the Revolutionary War, and 
attempting to reconcile with Great Britain, the United States faced 
conflict with Indian tribes that threatened the entire success of the 
nation.  
 It is undeniable that the nation’s early success was largely 
tied to Indian relations. In some sense this was because 
Washington and other national leaders saw the nation’s success as 
contingent upon the opening of the Northwest Territory. The 
Treaty of Paris, which signified the official end of the American 
Revolution in 1783, extended the western border of the United 
States to the Mississippi River. The Continental Congress, the 
governing body from the Revolution until the establishment of the 
new federal government in 1789, planned to decrease national debt 
by selling this land to settlers on the western frontier.  
 However, the Native Americans living in this territory were 
not consulted when the Treaty of Paris was signed. Tension and 
animosity exploded as the United States attempted to assert their 
dominance on the lands that Native Americans still claimed. These 
tensions had years to build up between the end of the 
Revolutionary War and when Washington took office in 1789. 
However, until Washington's presidency the Continental Congress 
did not take Native American opinion into consideration when 
forming Indian policy. Continued violence marked the relationship 
between the frontier settlers and several western Native American 
tribes. As a result, Washington accepted his presidency just as 
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conflicts were reaching a climax. Frontiersmen demanded federal 
protection from the Indians; Indians refused to cede their lands, 
demanding that the borderline of the United States be moved back 
to its previous point at the Ohio River. Yet, with no regular army, 
minimal federal funds, and a government in its infancy, 
Washington was hardly in an optimal position to deal with this 
conflict. It was crucial that he deal with this issue effectively, as 
this was one of the first tests of the new nation's governing ability. 
 Washington was torn. While he wanted to come to a 
peaceful settlement with the dominant Northwestern Indian tribes, 
the Indians were not willing to make peace with the new 
Mississippi River land boundary and the United States was not 
willing to give up the Northwest Territory. Settlers were eager to 
move into the area, and Congress linked the progress of the nation 
to the acquisition of this territory. It seemed that Washington had 
no choice but to assert American authority and use force against 
the Indians. After all, simply conceding to them would make the 
United States federal government appear weak to Great Britain, the 
Indian tribes, and to the citizens of the United States. The federal 
government decided it would be in the United States' best interest 
to launch a military expedition to punish the aggressive Indian 
tribes. 
 The military campaigns sent by the United States to quell 
Indian hostilities in the Ohio country between 1790-1795 are 
collectively known as the Northwest Indian War. Historians have 
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noted this conflict as significant, and even critical, both in the 
course of Washington's presidency and the early development of 
the nation. However, there was no shortage of adversities for 
Washington to overcome as the first president of the United States, 
and the Northwest Indian War is often depicted as another issue on 
the list. Typically, this scholarship explores the Northwest Indian 
War in the context of overall Indian relations in the United States 
between 1785-1815. 232  Even Wiley Sword's President 
Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 
1790-1795 spends relatively little time exploring the deeper 
implications that these events had on the development of the 
United States. 233  More recently, Colin Calloway and William 
Patrick Walsh have focused on the nation's response to this 
conflict, but neither considers its impact in defining federal powers 
over the West and the states.234 An examination of the papers of 
George Washington and his contemporaries indicates how they 
used the Northwest Indian War as an opportunity to strengthen the 
federal government. Native American relations and policy during 
                                                          
232 Dale Van Every, Ark of Empire: The American Frontier, 1784-1803 (New 
York: William Morrow and Company, 1963); Reginald Horsman, Expansion 
and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812 (Norman, Oklahoma: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1967). 
233 Wiley Sword, President Washington’s Indian War (Norman, Oklahoma: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1985). 
234 Colin G. Calloway, The Victory with No Name: The Native American Defeat 
of the First American Army (New York: University of Oxford Press, 2015); 
William Patrick Walsh, "The Defeat of Major General Arthur St. Clair, 
November 4, 1791: A Study of the Nation's Response, 1791-1793" (PhD diss., 
Loyola University of Chicago, 1977). 
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this period were instrumental in defining the roles and abilities of 
the federal government. In many ways, the Northwest Indian War 
gave the United States the opportunity to establish how the federal 
government would be viewed not just by its own citizens, but by 
dominant powers of the world.  
 
Securing Indian Lands 
 A great deal of conflict occurred between the end of the 
Revolutionary War in 1783 and the establishment of the new 
federal government in 1789. This conflict defined the 
circumstances leading ultimately to the Northwest Indian War. 
During these years the United States operated under the governing 
body of the Continental Congress, which was established in 1774. 
At this time Congress set the precedent for what the United States' 
Native American policy would be, and the events of this period 
directly affected the circumstances that surrounded Washington 
when he entered the presidency.  
 At the conclusion of the American Revolution, the United 
States and Britain both signed the Treaty of Paris to officially 
establish peace between them. As a concession of this treaty, 
Britain ceded the land known as the Northwest Territory to the 
United States; the United States' western boarder was extended to 
the Mississippi River, which Britain permitted the United States to 
utilize for trade. The treaty also required Britain to remove all its 
soldiers from any western 
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forts they occupied, but the British continued to hold the forts of 
Michilimackinac, Detroit, Niagra, Oswego, Oswegatchie, and 
several others for more than a decade after the treaty was signed.235 
This allowed them to protect their extensive western trade and 
thereby maintain influence with their Native American allies, 
especially as the United States pushed into western territory.236 
                                                          
235 "The Definitive Treaty of Peace 1783," Avalon Project, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/paris.asp (accessed November 12, 
2015); Calloway, The Victory with No Name, 19. 
236 Colin G. Calloway, Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-
1815 (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 17.  
Old Northwest Region, 1783-90 in Wiley Sword, President 
Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 
1790-1795 (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1985), 2. 
 
Figure 1 
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The British presence in the Northwest Territory would be 
problematic for the United States in the years to come. 
 After the Treaty of Paris, treaty commissioners from the 
United States told the Indians living in the Northwest Territory that 
they were a conquered people, and as such were not entitled to live 
in the Northwest Territory. The Indians felt betrayed and 
abandoned by the British, who had not consulted them about the 
Treaty of Paris land cessions and left them to reconcile with the 
Americans on their own. The American federal government 
proceeded to develop their Indian policy around the assumption 
that the United States was the sovereign power in the Northwest 
Territory. 237  The implementation of this policy resulted in the 
Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Treaty of McIntosh, and the Treaty of Fort 
Finney. The United States used these three treaties to secure land 
from the Indians in the Northwest Territory. With each of these 
treaties, the United States commissioners indicated that they 
wanted to make peace with the Native Americans. However, when 
the Native American tribes arrived at the treaty meetings they 
found that the commissioners had little intention of actually 
negotiating with them.  
 In 1784, the United States made the Treaty of Fort Stanwix 
with the Six Nations of the Iroquois. The Iroquois arrived at Fort 
Stanwix in New York in October ready to discuss terms of peace. 
                                                          
237 Walsh, "The Defeat of Major General Arthur St. Clair," 10. 
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Instead, the congressional commissioners read them the terms of 
the Treaty of Paris and they asked the Indians to choose a 
boundary line between United States and Indian land.238 As some 
of the Iroquois tribes had been allied with the British during the 
Revolutionary War, the commissioners felt justified in dominating 
the treaty-making process. Cornplanter, a leader of the Seneca 
nation, acted as a spokesman and proposed to uphold the Ohio 
River boundary that had been established in a former treaty, the 
1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix. Cornplanter explained that the 
traditional role of the Six Nations was to speak on behalf of the 
other western tribes and such a boundary would be in the best 
interest of all the western Indian tribes.239 However, this boundary 
would have cut the United States off from much of the Northwest 
Territory. The commissioners told the Iroquois that they had no 
right to propose such a conservative boundary, as the United States 
was now the sovereign power in the Northwest Territory. They 
then offered the Iroquois an ultimatum: give up their land claims in 
the Northwest Territory, or face war with the United States.240  
 The 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix ultimately caused a divide 
in the Iroquois nations. With each nation on different standing with 
                                                          
238 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 24. 
239 Thomas S. Abler, Cornplanter: Chief Warrior of the Alleghany Senecas 
(Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2007), 66. 
240 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 25; "Treaty With the Six 
Nations: 1784," Avalon Project, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/six1784.asp (accessed November 13, 
2015). 
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the United States it was difficult for the Six Nations to remain 
firmly unified and their confederacy began to deteriorate. Thus, the 
dominance of the Iroquois declined among the western Indians. As 
Cornplanter indicated in the treaty deliberations, the Iroquois had 
traditionally been a dominant force in the intertribal dynamic of the 
Northwest Territory. This gave way for the Shawnee and Miami, 
two tribes affected by a later treaty, to become more dominant 
powers in the west.241  
 The Americans enacted a second peace treaty, known as the 
Treaty of Fort McIntosh, with the Delaware and Wyandot tribes. 
The signing of this treaty took place thirty miles northwest of 
Pittsburgh in January, 1785. As with the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, 
the commissioners threatened war if these Indian tribes did not 
give up their lands and agree to live on designated United States 
reservations in the northern part of Ohio.242 The last of these three 
treaties was made with the Shawnee, Miami, Potawatomi, and 
various Wabash tribes. Known as the Treaty of Fort Finney, or the 
Treaty at the Mouth of the Great Miami, it took place at the 
convergence of the Miami and Ohio Rivers in January, 1786. It 
restricted the Shawnee to a reservation next to the designated 
Delaware and Wyandot reservations in the northern corner of Ohio 
                                                          
241 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 26. 
242 Ibid., 28. 
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and Indiana.243 Aware of the results of the Treaties of Fort Stanwix 
and Fort McIntosh, the Indians put up significant resistance at Fort 
Finney. The Miami outright refused to comply with the terms of 
the treaty and many of the Shawnee were strongly opposed to it as 
well. Apprehensive about making war with the Americans, 
however, resentful Shawnee leaders finally agreed to sign the 
treaty.  
 It was fortunate for the United States that all of the tribes 
they treated with agreed to their terms, for the United States did 
not have the military or monetary means necessary to go to war 
with the Native Americans. In fact, Congress' lack of funds was 
one of the major reasons that the United States vied for complete 
control of the Northwest Territory in the first place. At the end of 
the Revolutionary War the Continental Congress was about $40 
million in debt.244 Under the Articles of Confederation, the United 
States' first constitutional document, the government did not have 
the ability to impose taxes on the American people. As such, the 
acquisition of funds was crucial for the federal government. By 
obtaining the Northwest Territory, the federal government could 
sell tracts of land to settlers and maintain profitable trade by 
                                                          
243 "Treaty With the Shawnee: 1786," Avalon Project, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/shaw1786.asp (accessed November 13, 
2015); Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 30. 
244 Calloway, The Victory with No Name, 36. 
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having access to the Mississippi River.245 Additionally, without the 
money to fund an army to remove the Indians, the federal 
government would not be able to make good on their threats to go 
to war with the Indians, and needed to entice them to leave through 
peaceful means. United States Native American policy was 
entirely driven by the notion that securing peace with the Indians 
would be the easiest and cheapest way of acquiring the Northwest 
Territory.246 
 
                                                          
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid., 25. 
American Treaties, 1783-86 in Wiley Sword, President 
Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 
1790-1795 (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1985), 22. 
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Hostilities on the Frontier and the Miami Confederacy 
 Soon after the conclusion of the Treaty of Fort Finney, 
violence emerged on the frontier. It became clear just how 
dissatisfied the Indians were with the treaty settlements. Henry 
Knox, Secretary of War under the Continental Congress and during 
Washington's presidency, was responsible for handling Indian 
affairs. In 1786, Revolutionary War veteran General Josiah Harmar 
wrote Knox to update him on the conditions in the Northwest 
Territory. In his letter, Harmar explained to Knox that land 
surveyors were eager to go out into the Northwest Territory and 
were requesting escorts from Harmar. Because settlers were 
already being attacked, Harmar feared that armed escorts would 
bring out more hostilities from the angered Indians: "The murders 
that have been committed lately upon the inhabitants passing up 
and down the Ohio, indicate great dissatisfaction prevailing 
amongst the Indians."247 
 In the end months of 1786, various Indian tribes organized 
a council in Sandusky, Ohio to discuss their dissatisfaction with 
the treaties made with them and relations with the United States. 
The Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa, Miami, 
Potawatomi, Cherokee, Six Nations, and members of the Wabash 
                                                          
247 William Henry Smith, ed., The St. Clair Papers: The Life and Public Services 
of Arthur St. Clair Solider of the Revolutionary War; President of the 
Continental Congress; and Governor of the North-Western Territory with his 
Correspondence and other Papers (Cincinnati, Ohio: Robert Clarke & Co, 
1882), 2:14. 
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Confederacy were all present. 248  As each tribe had varying 
experiences with the United States, there was some inconsistency 
among their views. Some tribes, like the Delaware, Wyandot, and 
the Seneca of the Six Nations were willing to promote amiable 
relations with the United States. Joseph Brant, leader of the 
Mohawk of the Six Nations, was not willing to settle for the 
provisions made for his tribe in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, but was 
inclined to seek assistance in acquiring new land from the British 
in Canada rather than engage in war with the Americans. On the 
other hand, the Shawnee, Miami, and members of the Wabash 
Confederacy were adamant about fighting to protect their lands 
from the Americans.249 These tribes, along with several Iroquois 
tribes, the Ojibwa, the Ottawa, and the Potawatomi, formed the 
Miami Confederacy, or the Northwest Confederacy.250 The Miami 
Confederacy, which was united loosely under the leadership of 
Miami warrior chief Little Turtle, formed with the common 
purpose of preventing the United States from taking any lands past 
the Ohio River.251  
 Amidst these growing tensions, the United States drafted 
the Northwest Ordinance in 1787. The purpose of the Northwest 
                                                          
248 Sword, President Washington's Indian War, 41. 
249 Ibid., 42. 
250 Calloway, The Victory with No Name, 96. 
251 Harvey Lewis Carter, The Life and Times of Little Turtle: First Sagamore of 
the Wabash (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 61; Bert Anson, The 
Miami Confederacy (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press,1970), 
105. 
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Ordinance was to dictate how the Northwest Territory might be 
organized and inducted into the United States. However, since the 
federal government was aware of Indian grievances, the Northwest 
Ordinance also affirmed that the United States would respect 
Indian rights in regards to assuming Indian lands. The ordinance 
dictated that the Northwest Territory be divided into no less than 
three and no more than five states. Once a piece of territory 
accumulated at least 60,000 free inhabitants the government would 
admit it into the United States on equal status with all other 
states.252  
 The ordinance also specifically stated that the "utmost good 
faith shall always be observed towards the Indians" and that "their 
lands and property shall never be taken from them without their 
consent." 253  While historians such as Reginald Horsman have 
asserted that the language of the Northwest Ordinance indicated a 
shift in Indian policy at this time, the federal government's 
subsequent actions do not reflect the language of the Ordinance, 
and it seems that there was little shift in Native American policy 
during this period. The Ordinance indicated willingness to 
                                                          
252 "Northwest Ordinance," Avalon Project, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nworder.asp (accessed October 21, 
2015). 
253 Smith, St. Clair Papers, 2:36; American State Papers: Documents, 
Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, Class II, Indian 
Affairs, edited by Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke (Washington DC: 
Gales and Seaton, 1832), online, 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsp.html, 2:9 (hereafter American State 
Papers). 
150 
 
negotiate with the Indians. However, rather than negotiate with the 
Indians, the federal government's simply tried to pay for the land 
that they previously asserted was conquered territory. While this 
change in technique certainly suggested a shift in attitude on the 
United States' part, their end goal of acquiring those lands by any 
means necessary remained the same.  
 Under the Northwest Ordinance, veteran of the American 
Revolution Arthur St. Clair became the governor of the Northwest 
Territory. Part of his initial instructions from Congress was to 
make treaties with the Indians should the situation require it. As 
hostilities had increased in recent months, it was clear that a treaty 
was necessary. St. Clair was directed to alleviate "all causes of 
controversy, so that peace and harmony may continue between the 
United States and the Indian tribes, the regulating trade, and 
settling boundaries." Congress authorized money specifically for 
the purpose of renewing a treaty with the Indians, hoping that 
compensation for the land would settle any animosity with the 
Indians. In order to protect United States interest out west, St. 
Clair's instructions further required him to maintain the statutes of 
the current treaties, "unless a change of boundary beneficial to the 
United States can be obtained." Such specifications indicated that 
the United States was not actually willing to negotiate with the 
Indians, but rather wanted to reaffirm their former treaties.254 The 
                                                          
254 Smith, St. Clair Papers, 2:37; American State Papers, 1:9. 
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United States' actions therefore did not necessarily match the 
language of their policies, and their treatment of the Indians 
remained essentially the same. Although members of the federal 
government may have thought that they were being more 
conciliatory in offering monetary compensation for the lands they 
assumed, the issue for the Indians was not just in the lack of 
compensation. Rather, the Indians were upset that the federal 
government assumed it had any right to their lands at all. The 
government's offer to pay for the lands actually did little to 
alleviate any animosity. 
 St. Clair met with delegates from the Six Nations, 
Delaware, Wyandot, Ottawa, Ojibwa, and Potawatomi in 
December, 1788. Though invited, the aggravated Shawnee and 
Miami tribes refused to negotiate land cession with the United 
States and refused to participate in this treaty council.255 What the 
Indians desired out of this new treaty was a change in the land 
boundary back to the Ohio River.256 St. Clair refused, saying that 
the British had ceded these lands to the United States and that the 
boundaries had been fixed by the Treaties of Fort Stanwix, Fort 
McIntosh, and Fort Finney. St. Clair concluded deliberations with 
the Indians by saying that the United States greatly desired peace 
with the Indians, but would go to war with them if necessary.257 
                                                          
255 Calloway, The Victory with No Name, 58, 59. 
256 Smith, St. Clair Papers, 2:110.  
257 Calloway, The Victory with No Name, 58; Smith, St. Clair Papers, 2:110. 
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Although this treaty council offered the Indians another chance to 
speak their piece, St. Clair still offered the same ultimatum. 
Backed into a corner once more, these Indian tribes hesitantly 
agreed. In January of 1789, St. Clair signed two treaties, together 
known as the Treaty of Fort Harmar: one with the Six Nations, and 
one with the Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Ojibwa, and 
Potawatomi. Though this treaty was another attempt by the United 
States to secure peace, it did nothing advantageous for either party. 
Rather, it simply served to reaffirm previous United States treaties 
and further anger the western Indian tribes. 
 
Washington as President 
 As the Miami Confederacy become more organized and 
aggravated by the new treaties, aggressions on the frontier 
continued to escalate. When Washington entered the presidency in 
1789, the hostilities seemed to be at their peak. Indian relations 
were one of Washington's top priorities when he entered the 
presidency. His aim was to find a way to make peace with the 
Indians so that American citizens could begin to settle the 
Northwest Territory without fear of conflict.  
 Washington's military career during the mid 1700s gave 
him experience with Indians. As such, he was regarded as 
somewhat of an Indian expert in the years leading up to his 
presidency. Washington had always advocated that maintaining 
peace with the Indians was crucial if the United States wanted to 
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settle the Northwest Territory. He believed that military action 
should only be taken against the Indians as a last resort, as 
purchasing Indian lands would be both cheaper and involve less 
bloodshed. 258  Washington took this policy with him into his 
presidency, and with violence at its peak, he developed several 
initiatives to help secure peace with the Indians. Secretary of War 
Knox was perhaps the most influential man in regards to Indian 
policy during Washington's presidency. Washington and Knox 
worked well together developing these policies, as they were 
generally in agreement about how to handle Indian affairs. Both 
Washington and Knox agreed that all measures should be taken to 
promote peace and make treaties with the Indians rather than 
engage in war. They believed it would be morally wrong to force 
the Indians off their land without just cause. Knox had a 
particularly sympathetic view towards the Indians. In a letter to 
Washington, Knox expressed a desire protect Indian interests, as 
the Indians were the "prior occupants" of the land, and as such 
"possess[ed] the right of the Soil" in the Northwest Territory. He 
was adamant that these lands "cannot be taken from them unless by 
their free consent, or by the right of a just War…" To do otherwise 
"would be a gross violation of the fundamental Laws of Nature and 
of that destributive [sic] justice which is the glory of a nation."259  
 Knox, like Washington, saw great potential for the nation 
                                                          
258 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 27. 
259 GW Presidential Papers, 2:491. 
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in possession of the Northwest Territory. However, he believed 
that there was little need to use force to acquire vast amounts of 
land from the Indians: "As the settlements of the whites shall 
approach near to the indian boundaries established by treaties, the 
game will be diminished and the lands being valuable to the 
indians only as hunting grounds, they will be willing to sell further 
tracts for small considerations…" As their resources were 
gradually depleted, Knox continued, the Indian populations would 
decrease, "enabl[ing] the Union to operate against them [in battle] 
with much greater prospect than at present." 260  Knox therefore 
asserted that making peace with the Indians was in the best interest 
of all, as going to war with them would hardly be worthwhile when 
the United States would likely be able to acquire more lands from 
them in the coming years. 
 In general, Washington's Indian policies involved 
strengthening the power of the federal government so that it could 
better handle Indian relations. One of Washington's main goals 
was to make sure that the federal government, not individual states, 
was in charge of handling all Indian relations and treaties. In a 
letter to Washington July, 1789, Knox confirmed his agreement 
that the "general Sovereignty must possess the right of making all 
treaties on the execution of violation of which depend peace or 
war." 261  Given the recent rise in hostilities on the frontier, 
                                                          
260 Ibid., 494. 
261 Ibid., 138. 
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Washington saw the demonstration of federal authority in Indian 
affairs as crucial. In his mind, centralization of federal power 
would enable the government to hold Indians and American 
citizens accountable for any violence they caused, thereby 
discouraging them from engaging in further hostilities. 
 There were, however, significant set-backs in Washington's 
efforts to ensure peace by promoting Indian confidence in the 
federal government. The federal government's failure to 
immediately engage in military combat with the Indians caused the 
citizens on the frontier to lose faith in the federal government's 
ability to protect them. They therefore implemented their own kind 
of punishment against the Indians, continuing more localized 
aggressions towards Indians. This in turn made the Indians 
question the federal government's sincerity and ability to uphold 
their promises of holding the frontiersmen responsible for killing 
Indians. Unfortunately, many of the victimized tribes were not 
actively hostile towards the United States. The Miami and 
Shawnee, two more western-based tribes, were particularly hostile 
towards citizens on the frontier, but angry frontiersmen generally 
attacked Indians indiscriminately. Governor St. Clair wrote 
Washington in September, 1789 explaining the situation: "It is not 
to be expected, sir, that the Kentucky people will or can submit 
patiently to the cruelties and depredations of those savages; they 
are in the habit of retaliation, perhaps, without attending precisely 
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to the nations from which the injuries are received…"262 Thus, the 
hostilities on the frontier not only aggravated already existing 
animosity with the Indians, but also threatened the peaceful 
relations that the United States had managed to secure with more 
eastern-based tribes such as the Seneca.  
 While Washington and Knox both wanted to secure peace, 
neither was willing to compromise the overall well-being of the 
nation or the protection of its citizens. Washington had instructed 
St. Clair to use military force on the frontier only as a last resort, 
but by 1790, it was becoming increasingly clear that a last resort 
might be necessary to subdue the Indians. 263  In a "Summary 
Statement of the Situation of the Frontiers by the Secretary of 
War" Knox explained that Josiah Harmar had given numerous 
accounts of the "depredations of the Indians on the boats going 
down the Ohio…" Knox noted the "bad effect [these hostilities 
had] on the public mind…The result of this whole information 
shows the inefficiency of defensive operations against the banditti 
Shawnese and Cherokees, and some of the Wabash Indians on the 
north-west of the Ohio." He therefore concluded that a military 
expedition to punish the Indians and defend the frontier was the 
right course of action.264 It was no secret that Washington wanted 
to build a stronger army when he entered the presidency. In his 
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first address to Congress in January of 1790, he formally proposed 
his goal of "of providing for the common defense." Washington 
was a firm believer that being "prepared for war is one of the most 
effectual means of preserving peace."265 He hoped that by building 
up the national army he could intimidate the Indians into agreeing 
to peace with the United States.266 
  
Harmar's Defeat 
 Still hoping for a peaceful outcome, Congress nevertheless 
agreed to Washington's plan of using the army to intimidate the 
Indians. In 1790, Congress authorized an expansion of the army. 
Led by Josiah Harmar, the new army would have one thousand 
regulars and fifteen hundred militiamen from the states of 
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. 267  By late 1790, the 
increasing conflict on the frontier made it clear that the Indians 
were not going to be intimidated into making peace, and the United 
States government would have to use force against them. Referring 
back to the Northwest Ordinance, Washington and Congress 
viewed this military expedition as a "just and lawful war," in which 
they would swiftly punish the Indians for their destruction on the 
frontier. In Knox's orders to Harmar on June 7, 1790, Knox stated 
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that "No other remedy remains, but to extirpate, utterly, if possible, 
the [Indian] banditti."268 The plan was for Harmar to lead the main 
body of troops west from Fort Washington to attack Miami 
villages along the Maumee River, while Major John Hamtramck 
came from Fort Knox in the west with three hundred regulars and 
three hundred Kentucky militiamen.269 
 As the United States prepared for their military expedition, 
the federal government came to the agreement that the British 
should be made aware of their plans. Since the British had not 
actually left their western forts after the signing of the Treaty of 
Paris, the United States did not want the British to think the 
military expedition was aimed at pushing them out of the 
Northwest Territory and risk renewing hostilities with them. As 
such, Knox ordered St. Clair to contact the British commander at 
Detroit and explain that the expedition was purely for the purpose 
of punishing Indians who had been aggressive towards the United 
States.270  
 Although the British commander assured St. Clair that they 
were not concerned about this, they immediately notified British 
traders in Miami villages, who assisted the Indians by giving them 
supplies to prepare for an attack from the United States. When 
Harmar and his men reached the Miami villages in the middle of 
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October, they found them abandoned, as the Indians had been 
warned ahead of time. The army burned the villages regardless, 
thinking that if they could not punish the Indians directly, they 
could at least destroy their homes and supplies. Meanwhile, 
Harmar sent Colonel John Hardin and approximately three hundred 
men to pursue the fleeing Indians. Instead of a swift subjugation of 
the Indians, Hardin found an ambush waiting for him and his men. 
Taken by surprise, the men lost all organization and dispersed. The 
militiamen fled the scene completely, leaving the regulars to fend 
for themselves. After a brutal attack that left almost two hundred 
dead and several dozen wounded, the regulars retreated back to the 
rest of the army.271  
 Washington was extremely angered by this loss and blamed 
the defeat on Harmar's perceived deficiencies. In a letter to Knox, 
Washington accused Harmar of being both a drunkard and an 
ineffective leader: "I expected little from the moment I heard he 
was a drunkard. I expected less as soon as I heard that on this 
account no confidence was reposed to him by the people of the 
Western Country—And I gave up all hope of Success, as soon as I 
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heard that there were disputes with him about command." 272 
Despite Washington's fervor in his criticisms of Harmar, the 
responsibility of the defeat did not rest solely on Harmar's 
shoulders. In fact, most of Washington's assertions about Harmar's 
conduct were false. According to Washington biographer John 
Ferling, Washington was inclined to find scapegoats to blame 
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when situations under his command deteriorated.273 Harmar was 
certainly the easiest man to blame in this instance, and his 
reputation never fully recovered.  
 In truth, the failure of the expedition should be attributed to 
a myriad of factors, the most significant being the poor quality of 
the militia. The militia, comprised of ill-trained men not entirely fit 
for military work, made up the majority of the military force of this 
expedition. Their haste to abandon the battle as soon as they were 
under attack left the regulars severely outnumbered, which 
essentially forced them to retreat.274 Moreover, the entire force was 
significantly weakened when Harmar authorized his troops to 
separate into different groups. Only a small portion of the available 
men were actually present during the Indian attack, as the rest had 
remained to burn the villages.275 In the planning of this expedition, 
Congress specifically authorized the recruitment of more men so 
that Harmar would be prepared should the Indians have managed 
to accrue a strong force of warriors against them. Regardless of the 
reasoning behind Harmar's failure, hostilities on the frontier 
increased as a result of this direct attack on the Indians. Fear 
among frontier settlers was rising, and they demanded that the 
federal government act to protect them. The federal government 
hastily began plans for a new military expedition. 
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St. Clair's Defeat 
 Washington and Congress knew that they had to deal with 
the Indian problem immediately. Many Americans had not 
believed the Indians capable of raising a force able to defeat an 
organized American army. The results of the expedition proved 
otherwise and frontier settlers began to panic that they would be 
the victims of a mass Indian attack. Knox and Washington quickly 
set about planning for a second expedition. They appealed to 
Congress for an expansion of the army to three thousand men. This 
time they called for twelve hundred regulars, thirteen hundred 
volunteer levies, and five hundred rangers. 276  It was not too 
difficult for Washington and Knox to convince Congress that such 
an expansion was necessary, as both Harmar and Washington's 
administration had blamed the failure of the expedition at least 
partly on the inadequacy of the militia.  
 Harmar's failed expedition had threatened the federal 
government's reputation—it was now in jeopardy of being seen as 
incapable of protecting its citizens and ineffective in handling 
disputes. Yet, in some sense Harmar's defeat was advantageous to 
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Washington, as it enabled him to set the foundation for a 
reformation of the militia system. Washington's contemporaries 
had known his distaste for the militia since the Revolutionary War, 
and many had expected him to appeal for the creation of a large 
national army when he came into office. Although Washington 
avoided aligning with any particular political faction, like many of 
his Federalist contemporaries he desired a strong standing army to 
protect the nation and demonstrate the power of the federal 
government. However, Washington was aware of political tensions 
between the emerging Federalist and Democratic-Republican 
political parties. He did not want party alliances to divide the 
nation, and he avoided aligning with either party, despite his 
agreement with certain Federalist views. He knew that pushing for 
a standing army upon his entrance into the presidency would be 
viewed unfavorably by many citizens. Many Americans associated 
standing armies with martial law from their experiences with the 
presence of the British army during the Revolution.277  
 Washington hoped that by using more regulars and 
volunteers the army would be an adequately trained force to 
accomplish the goal of subduing the Indians. Unlike militiamen, 
regulars and volunteers were required to submit to traditional 
military discipline. These men would not only be better trained, but 
also act more professionally in the face of battle.278 Washington 
                                                          
277 Ferling, The Ascent of George Washington, 320. 
278 Ibid. 
164 
 
appointed St. Clair as major general of this new army, hoping that 
he would prove a better leader than Harmar.  
 St. Claire's plan was to leave Philadelphia in March, 1791, 
lead his army to Fort Washington in order to meet Kentucky 
militiamen, and then proceed with the attack in the Wabash Valley. 
However, St. Clair left Philadelphia later than planned and faced 
additional unforeseen delays, as he had difficulty acquiring 
sufficient numbers of men and adequate supplies. St. Clair did not 
reach Fort Washington until the middle of May, and even then not 
all the militia had arrived from other states. The troops were not 
fully convened until September, at which point it was late in the 
season to be embarking on a military expedition as they risked 
suffering through the winter months.279 St. Clair, however, assured 
Knox in a letter on September 18, 1791 "that every possible 
exertion shall be made to bring the campaign to a speedy and 
happy issue."280 Despite the delays St. Clair felt secure his ability 
to lead a successful expedition. He was certain of the superior 
military ability of the United States army. He felt, as did Knox and 
many of his other contemporaries, sure that the disjointed war 
tactics of the Indians would be no match for his disciplined army, 
even if the Indians managed to outnumber them.281 
 St. Clair should have not have so greatly underestimated his 
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opponents; he and his men expected the Indians to be severely 
disorganized. But what they did not know was that the Indians, led 
by the Miami and Shawnee tribes, had gone to Detroit after the 
incident with Harmar to request assistance from the British. Blue 
Jacket, one of the Shawnee leaders, appealed to the British saying 
the United States had plans to take all their lands: "as a People we 
are determined to meet the approaches of an Enemy, who came not 
to check the Insolence of individuals, but with a premeditated 
design to root us out of our Land, which we and our forefathers 
and children were and are bound to defend, and which we are 
determined to do."282 The commanding officers in Detroit told the 
Indians that they could offer no troops to support them, as they 
would risk getting into conflict with the United States. They did, 
however, offer the Indians supplies they needed to take on the 
American troops.  
 Not only were the Indians able to obtain British support, 
but they also managed to become much more organized than St. 
Clair, Knox, or Washington could have anticipated. Harmar's 
expedition had confirmed the fears of Indian tribes in the Wabash 
that the United States had the intention of usurping all western 
Indian lands. Other tribes, such as the Kickapoo, Wea, and 
Piankeshaw, who had been on the fence about combating the 
Americans were now convinced of American intentions and came 
                                                          
282 National Archives (U.K.), Colonial Office Records, Class 42, 73: 37-40, 
quoted in Calloway, The Victory with No Name, 105. 
166 
 
to the aid of the Miami and the Shawnee.283 The desperate fear of 
losing their lands banned these tribes together. Having caught wind 
of the American army's plans, they made their way to the Miami 
villages to prepare to ambush the American army. 
 On November 4, 1791 as St. Clair and his men finally made 
their way to the Miami villages, they were met with a full-blown 
Indian attack.284 The Indians completely surrounded the American 
army with organization that blindsided St. Clair and overwhelmed 
his men. The Indians used their traditional style of warfare and 
their knowledge of European war tactics to their advantage. The 
Indians were used to fighting as individuals, and they swiftly 
overtook American soldiers. They specifically targeted military 
officers, as they knew that without leadership the American 
soldiers would be completely disoriented and unable to fight as a 
unit.285 Those who survived the attack retreated to Fort Jefferson 
on St. Clair's orders. The losses were devastating. Thirty-seven 
officers and nearly six hundred enlisted men were killed, while 
thirty-two officers and approximately two-hundred and fifty men 
were wounded.286  
 On November 9, after St. Clair and his men had made it 
back to Fort Washington, St. Clair wrote Knox to tell him of the 
terrible loss. Washington was furious about the results of this 
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second campaign. He was now in a difficult position and faced a 
great deal of criticism. How could he explain how the military 
expedition had failed a second time? While he was able to blame 
the incompetency of Harmar for the failure of the first expedition, 
he knew he could not blame St. Clair this time, as it would only 
show that he was unable to provide a capable general for this 
task.287 Similarly, the militia could not be solely to blame, as much 
of the militia of the last expedition had been replaced by regulars 
for St. Clair's expedition.288 Washington had to report to Congress 
news of the defeat, and a special committee was developed to 
investigate what led to the loss of the expedition. 
 As the committee sought to get to the bottom of the matter, 
newspapers such as the New York Journal & Patriotic Register, 
Columbian Centinel, Connecticut Courant, and Maryland Gazette 
all published accounts of St. Clair's Defeat, which stirred up a 
variety of public opinions. 289  A typical reaction to St. Clair's 
Defeat was a desire for revenge on the murderous Indians. A 
Kentucky resident wrote to a friend in Philadelphia, “The news of 
the defeat of the troops under Gov. St. Clair by the Indians, so far 
from disheartening has filled every man in Kentucky with a thirst 
for revenge.”290  
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 Some members of the public were angered that the United 
States had attempted such an incursion in the first place, and felt 
that the United States was causing unnecessary problems with the 
Indians: "Are we not already in possession of more lands than can 
be settled for a century at least? … What better right have we to 
march through the centre of their country, than Great-Britain 
would have to march a body of troops through the centre of the 
United States?"291 In speaking so vehemently against the Indian 
expeditions, this writer, under the pseudonym "Anti-Pizaro," 
accused the federal government of impeding on the rights of the 
Indians to acquire more lands. He also raised questions about the 
real motivations for such an excursion: "Is it to conquer more 
lands, or to serve as a pretence for augmenting the standing 
army?" 292  The public was clearly questioning the government's 
Indian policies and motivations in the Indian war. Many worried 
that it was part of a Federalist ploy to give the government more 
power.  
 Another segment, this time appearing in the National 
Gazette, seconded that sentiment: 
 
The principles of the war it is hoped, 
will be thoroughly investigated, that 
the revenues of the States should not 
be wantonly expended in disgraceful 
campaigns. Americans having just 
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freed themselves from an expensive 
war, it is our interest to promote 
friendship and harmony with all the 
world, and not to sacrifice our young 
men and our money, to acquire 
territory by war, while so much land 
remains unsettled, and which courts 
our cultivation under the auspices of 
peace.293 
 
This author stated that the federal government's reckless ambitions 
to secure the Northwest Territory were a waste of both men and 
money. Moreover, he implied that engaging in an unnecessary war 
to acquire lands painted the United States in a negative light to 
other nations, making the United States seem greedy and 
uncompromising. 
 Yet, there was also a portion of the public who supported 
Washington and his Native American policies. Rather than 
asserting that the United States had selfish and unjust motives in 
sending soldiers into the Northwest Territory, these citizens 
defended Washington and the federal government, assuring readers 
that Washington had been forced into taking military action in 
order to protect the nation. In one article posted in the Connecticut 
Gazette gave an explanation of how treaties were attempted with 
the hostile Wabash Indians, but they declined the offer and 
continued their hostilities: "The campaign, therefore, of the last 
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St. Clair's Defeat Battle Map in Colin G. Calloway, The 
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and this year, were measures of necessity—The Indians had been 
invading our frontiers, and had killed many hundred innocent men, 
women and children..."294 Citizens of this opinion were grateful 
that the government had taken action to protect them.  
 These inconsistent views about the Northwest Indian War 
are representative of the larger national debate at this time. Party 
alliances were becoming increasingly distinct, which resulted in 
starkly contrasting views about what the roles and responsibilities 
of the federal government should be. The special committee 
focused on many of these issues in their investigation of St. Clair's 
Defeat, questioning the amount of authority the federal 
government should have and what the responsibilities of elected 
officials were. Ultimately St. Clair was pardoned from any 
responsibility for the defeat. Congress and other elected officials 
were blamed for the delay in securing adequate funds for the 
expedition. Although it was not overtly stated, Washington and 
Knox also received a great deal of blame, as they had given the 
orders for St. Clair's campaign.295 St. Clair's Defeat had brought on 
a great deal of criticism of the federal government. 
 
Assertion of Federal Power and Wayne's Campaign 
 It was clear at this point that there was a divide within the 
United States about whether this Indian war should have taken 
                                                          
294 Connecticut Gazette, January 5, 1792. 
295 Calloway, The Victory with No Name, 136-137. 
172 
 
place at all. Many people were questioning the moral validity of 
the war as well as the creation of an army to deal with the issue. 
The political divide between Democratic-Republicans and 
Federalists became much more distinct as Congress and 
Washington's administration debated what course of action to 
take. 296  The Democratic-Republicans thought that the federal 
government was out of its depth and abusing its power to take over 
the Northwest Territory, while the Federalists tended to support the 
power of the federal government. Throughout the debate 
Washington maintained that the federal government needed to be 
consistent and continue its aims to take control of the Northwest 
Territory.297 Now more than ever he felt it was essential to the 
federal government's reputation that they succeed. 
 Congress tended to agree with Washington. After two 
failed expeditions, it would make the United States appear weak to 
simply give up. The federal government sincerely needed to prove 
its capability to its citizens. However, America's armed forces 
desperately needed to be salvaged after St. Clair's defeat and 
Congress feared that the frontier would experience the full extent 
of Indian wrath while they were trying to rebuild the army. 298 
Therefore, while Washington and Knox worked on a plan for the 
new army, Congress authorized peace commissioners to meet with 
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the Indians early in 1792. The Shawnee and Miami attended the 
meeting, along with several of the tribes that allied with them. The 
Shawnee and Miami also managed to convince the Six Nations to 
negotiate as well, although they had minimal involvement with the 
Northwest Indian War. 
 It is unlikely that the federal government actually expected 
peace to come out of this meeting. Although it certainly would 
have been optimal for the United States for the Indians to concede 
to give up their lands peacefully, no one believed that to be a 
realistic outcome. British lieutenant governor of Upper Canada 
John Graves Simcoe indicated that he believed that the Indians and 
Americans commissioners had met for the same reason: not 
actually to secure peace, but to procrastinate. In fact, he believed 
that the meeting was only a way for both sides to be assured in 
their missions: for the Americans, that the Indians needed to be 
destroyed; for the Indians, that the United States must be stopped 
in their efforts to take Indians lands.299  
 The peace talk went exactly as expected: neither side was 
willing to compromise. The American commissioners attempted to 
assure the Indians that they wanted to make peace with them, while 
the Indians declared to the commissioners that if the United States 
did not abide by the Ohio River boundary line, there could be no 
peace. The commissioners held firm, saying that as the Indians' 
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land had been ceded in the Treaty of Paris. The Indians responded 
that they had never agreed to give possession of their lands to the 
king of England, so it was not his land to cede to the United 
States.300 The Indians then declared that they would not leave the 
lands that were rightfully theirs. The American commissioners 
then resolved to return home, unable to make peace once more. 
 Meanwhile, Washington and Knox had been hard at work 
reforming the United States army. Now that circumstances 
demanded an army for the protection of the nation, Washington 
was able to develop a large standing army and reform the militia 
system, as he and his Federalist contemporaries had always wanted 
to do. 301  Knox developed a proposal for a new army of five 
thousand men to be enlisted for three years. In his proposal, Knox 
asserted that use of the militia for situations such as this would not 
be sufficient: "while it is acknowledged that mounted militia may 
be very proper for sudden enterprises, of short duration, it is 
conceived that militia are utterly unsuitable to carry on and 
terminate the war in which we are engaged, with honor and 
success."302 Knox and Washington also reorganized the army from 
an infantry, cavalry, and artillery into four sublegions, each 
commanded by a brigadier general. Washington appointed General 
Anthony Wayne, another veteran of the Revolution, to command 
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this army. 
 As for reforming the militia, Congress passed two acts that 
changed militia regulations. The first gave the president the ability 
to call upon the state militias when the nation was in jeopardy. The 
second act required all capable free white men between the ages of 
eighteen and forty-five to enroll in the militia. Overall, these 
military reforms strengthened the power of the federal government, 
as they gave the government much more military authority. 
 With this new force under his command, General Wayne 
arrived at Fort Washington in May, 1793 and began to prepare for 
the expedition. From the beginning this campaign went much more 
smoothly than the others. By the end of December Wayne and his 
men had made their way to the site of St. Clair's Defeat, 
established Fort Greenville, and set themselves up to remain there 
for the winter.303 In June, the Indians attempted an attack on the 
fort, but were fought off by the American army. The Potawatomi, 
Ojibwa, and Ottawa tribes were discouraged by this unsuccessful 
attack and abandoned the rest of the Miami Confederacy, greatly 
reducing the military power of their union. The army under 
Wayne's command was far more prepared for frontier fighting than 
that of either St. Clair or Harmar. To further weaken the Indian 
forces, Wayne's plan was to target the Indian villages' food and 
supplies as he and his army made their way along the Auglaize 
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River. By August, Wayne and his men held the center of the 
Miami Confederacy at the intersection of the Maumee and 
Auglaize Rivers.  
 On August 19, the Indians prepared to meet the American 
army. The battle that came to be known as the Battle of Fallen 
Timbers took place the following morning. When the battle 
occurred, it was clear the Indians were severely outnumbered. This 
time the American army's organization and discipline were more 
than adequate to take on the Indians. The Americans quickly 
overtook the Indians, who retreated and sought assistance from the 
British at Fort Miami. The British, despite their previous 
assistance, were now engaged in the French Revolution in Europe 
and unwilling to risk conflict with the Americans. They refused to 
help the Indians, leaving them to fend for themselves. 304 Thus, 
Wayne's army was easily able to overtake the retreating Indians. 
The Battle of Fallen Timbers was, finally, an American victory. 
 In December of 1794, Wayne met with the Indian tribes to 
discuss peace. They agreed to meet in June of 1795 at Greenville 
to set a formal treaty.305 That summer, the Indians officially signed 
the Treaty of Greenville that waived their rights to two-thirds of 
Ohio and some smaller pieces of land in Indiana. Leaders of the 
Shawnee, Wyandot, Ottawa, and Delaware all signed the 
document. The Northwest Indian War was finally over and the 
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Figure 5 
Wayne's Campaign, July-Aug., 1790 in Wiley Sword, President 
Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 
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federal government had demonstrated its authority. To uphold 
authority in the Northwest Territory, the federal government 
maintained a military presence on the frontier to supply forts that 
protected western trade.306 Around the same time, in November, 
1794, United States delegate John Jay successfully negotiated a 
treaty with Britain. Jay's Treaty, as it was known, required Britain 
to finally relinquish its posts on the frontiers. With both treaties 
secured, the Americans finally had complete access to the 
Northwest Territory.  
 
Conclusion 
 What Washington and the United States federal 
government failed to realize was that from the moment the Treaty 
of Paris was signed, conflict with the Indians was inevitable.  So 
long as Indian policy operated under the assumption that the 
United States was the sovereign power in the Northwest Territory, 
Indian tribes were going to resist. The Indians had never 
recognized Great Britain as the previous sovereign power in the 
Northwest Territory, and thus felt the United States had no valid 
claim to the lands, especially since the Indians had no desire to 
give up those lands. The federal government wanted the 
impossible: they wanted the lands in the Northwest Territory and 
they wanted them peacefully. Their unwillingness to compromise 
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any of the lands in the Northwest Territory combined with their 
lack of respect for Indian rights to those lands set up explosive 
tensions that no amount of peace treaties could alleviate. 
 When Washington entered the presidency, his plan to 
secure peace with the Indians revolved around the strengthening of 
the federal government. Mainly, he wanted both the Indians and 
the individual states to recognize the federal government as the 
authority on Indian affairs, and to strengthen the United States' 
military force in order to enforce the federal government's power. 
As violence escalated on the frontier, the demands of citizens for 
protection from the federal government erupted. However, the new 
nation’s fragile state meant the federal government had little 
military power or funds to accomplish this. Two failed military 
expeditions against the Indians resulted in a federal reform of the 
army and militia system, significantly strengthening the power of 
the federal government. Without the violence of the Northwest 
Indian War, the demands for protection from United States citizens 
would not have driven Congress to make such federal reforms.  
 In this way, the events of the Northwest Indian War 
ultimately contributed to determining the role of the federal 
government in the early republic. With their demands for 
protection, American citizens on the frontier inadvertently 
conceded to a more centralized, more powerful government. Much 
to the chagrin of many of these citizens, the desire for a 
government that had the strength to protect them also created a 
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government with a capable force to use against them. When the 
Whiskey Rebellion erupted in Western Pennsylvania, Washington 
was able to quell the violent insurrection by calling upon the state 
militias in July, 1794. Such a use of force served to illustrate the 
newfound capabilities of the federal government to enforce their 
laws and policies throughout the nation. 
 Congress was right in asserting that the fate of the nation 
was tied to the acquisition of the Northwest Territory; yet, it was 
tied in unforeseeable ways. Beyond economic security, the events 
of the Northwest Indian War enabled Washington to achieve some 
of  his goals for the nation. Washington secured a stronger, 
more centralized government by calling for consolation of Indian 
affairs under the federal government and the creation of a federal 
army to protect the nation. Doing so ultimately allowed the United 
State to finally achieve victory in the Northwest Indian War. These 
policies certainly sparked contention among both citizens and 
Indians, raising questions as to the validity and justification of the 
United States' actions during the Northwest Indian War, the 
morality of which continues to be debated. Nevertheless, such a 
victory proved to American citizens, Indians, and European powers 
looking on that the United States was not only a force to be 
reckoned with, but worthy of "the respect of the world."  
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